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BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO

Benjamin Nathan Cardozo
Jurist, Philosopher,Humanitarian
ROBERT LEE TULLIS*
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo was born in the city of New York
on May 24, 1870. He died on July 9, 1938. The story of his early
intellectual life is told in the words of his close friend and former
associate, Judge Irving Lehman:
"At the age of nineteen, he graduated from Columbia College with high honors. A youth of frail physique and of reserved manner and spirit, he had little part in the sports or
social life of the college; yet, during his whole life, the men
who were in college with him gave him their admiring affection. A student of literature and philosophy, a lover of the
classics, he showed even in those early days that his deepest
interest was in contemporary thought and, especially, in contemporary political and governmental activities. It is significant that for the subject of his commencement oration he chose
'The Altruist in Politics' and for the subject of his bachelor's
thesis he chose 'Communism.',
Cardozo's rise to judicial eminence was totally uncolored by
partisan politics, a glowing tribute to the profundity of his legal
scholarship. Again we are indebted to Judge Lehman for the
following brief account:
"In6 1913, though he was an independent Democrat who
had never been active in politics and was known only to the
members of his own profession, he was nominated by a Fusion
group and elected a justice of the Supreme Court of New York.
In the campaign he had received the enthusiastic support of
the leaders of the bar and, as soon as he was elected, some of
them urged Governor Glynn to designate him to serve temporarily as an Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals. In spite
of Cardozo's lack of judicial experience, the designation was
made and it was received by the bench and bar with general
approval....
* Dean Emeritus, Louisiana State University Law School.

1. Lehman, Memorial to Justice Cardozo (1938) 24 A.B.A.J. 728.
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" . . . In January, 1917, Cardozo was appointed a regular
member of the court by Governor Whitman and, in the following November he was elected to that position for a term of
fourteen years, upon the nomination of both major parties. In
1926, upon similar nomination, he was elected Chief Judge of
the court. In 1932 he was appointed by President Hoover Jus'2
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The gist of Cardozo's philosophy is found in three slender
volumes. We may find the formulation of his creed in the first of
these, a publication entitled The Nature of the Judicial Process
which comprises a course of lectures delivered in 1921 before the
Law School of Yale University. It is almost at the close of the
last lecture that his confession of faith reaches its climax in a
passage of extraordinary beauty:
"I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the
bench, to find how trackless was the ocean on which I had
embarked. I sought for certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened when I found that the quest for it was futile. I was
trying to reach land, the solid land of fixed and settled rules,
the paradise of a justice that would declare itself by tokens
plainer and more commanding than its pale and glimmering
reflections in my own vacillating mind and conscience. I found
'with the voyagers in Browning's "Paracelsus" that the real
heaven was always beyond.' As the years have gone by, and
as I have reflected more and more upon the nature of the
judicial process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty,
because I have grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to
see that the process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but
creation; and that the doubts and misgivings, the hopes and
fears, are part of the travail of mind, the pangs of death and
the pangs of birth, in which principles that have served their
day expire, and new principles are born."'
Cardozo thus acknowledges that judges are subject to human
limitations. He does not doubt "the grandeur of the conception
which lifts them into the realm of pure reason" but contends
that "they do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights."
And so he rejects, on the one hand, the view of Montesquieu
who feels that judges are only the mouths that pronounce the law;
and, on the other hand, he finds too extreme the sentiment of
2. Ibid.
3. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 166-7.
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Saleilles who says of judges that "one wills at the beginning the
result; one finds the principle afterwards; such is the genesis of
all juridical construction."
The other two books which set forth Cardozo's philosophy are
The Growth of the Law, which is a publication of a second course
of lectures delivered at Yale University in 1923, and The Paradoxes of Legal Science which appeared in 1928.
Many of the profoundly disquieting problems affecting the
men of today are examined in these volumes. And so great is
Cardozo's skill that merely to discuss such problems is to illuminate them. For example, the causes of uncertainty in the law are
among the most harassing of all legal problems. Cardozo's analysis of one aspect of the difficulty must strike those who have
almost lost their way in groping for light among digests and
encyclopedias as particularly significant.
"The fecundity of our case law would make Malthus stand
aghast. Adherence to precedent was once a steadying force, the
guarantee, as it seemed, of stability and certainty. We would
not sacrifice any of the brood, and now the spawning progeny,
forgetful of our mercy, are rending those who spared them.
Increase of numbers has not made for increase of respect. The
output of a multitude of minds must be expected to contain its
proportion of vagaries. So vast a brood includes the defective
and the helpless. An avalanche of decisions by tribunals great
and small is producing a situation where citation of precedent
is tending to count for less, and appeal to an informing principle is tending to count for more .... The perplexity of the
judge becomes the scholar's opportunity."' 4
We shall not further multiply quotations from his extrajudicial utterances, but shall pass to what is shown concretely in
the course of his activities on the bench. Moreover, we shall not
concern ourselves with Cardozo's career on the New York Court
of Appeals. That fruitful episode in his life has already been the
subject of much attention by his biographers.5
It is noteworthy that in the first case in which Cardozo took
part in a decision of the United States Supreme Court, he dissented. It is even more noteworthy that despite his short stay
on this bench he lived to see that dissent become the law. The
first case, Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Company6 had held
4. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (1924) 4-5, 6.
5. E.g., Levy, Cardozo and Frontiers of Legal Thinking (1938).
6. 285 U.S. 393, 62 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932).
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that the proceeds of oil leases executed by the State of Oklahoma
on school lands was not subject to federal income tax in the
hands of the lessees, since the lease was an instrumentality of
the State in its exercise of a strictly governmental function. After
a lapse of but six years, this case was overruled 7 on the basis of
the dissent in the Coronado case. Cardozo thus early opposed a
strained construction of inhibitions upon the exercise of governmental taxing powers.
In all three of the Chain Store cases 8 in which Cardozo took
part, he voted to sustain the taxing power of the state. The latest
case, the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, involved
a Louisiana statute. It held that in adjusting the rate of tax for a
chain store within the state, the legislature may determine the
size of the chain by counting the total number of its units wherever located.
The famous case of Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States9
is conspicuous among the so-called New Deal cases, both for its
intrinsic importance and for the reason that the opinion of the
court was unanimous. Justice Cardozo, in his concurring opinion,
discussed separately the two principal questions: the delegation
of legislative power, and the scope of federal regulatory power
over commerce. So great was the power delegated to the President that Cardozo said:
"... If that conception shall prevail, anything that Congress
may do within the limits of the commerce clause for the betterment of business may be done by the President upon the
recommendation of a trade association by calling it a code.
This is delegation running riot. No such plentitude of power
is susceptible of transfer . .. 1
As to the power of Congress to regulate wages and hours of labor
in intrastate business, he used this emphatic language: "If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion of the forces that
oppose and counteract them, there will be an end to our federal
system.""
In the celebrated Social Security cases, Charles C. Steward
7. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 58 S.Ct. 623, 82
L.Ed. 607 (1938).
8. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 53 S.Ct. 481, 77 L.Ed. 929 (1933); Fox v.
Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 55 S.Ct. 333, 79 L.Ed. 780 (1935); Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 57 S.Ct. 772, 81 L.Ed. 1193 (1937).
9. 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935).
10. Id. at 553.
11. Id. at 554.
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Machine Co. v. Davis12 and Helvering v. Davis3 Cardozo was the
organ of the court. The first case dealt with the tax for unemployment insurance, the second with the tax for old age insurance.
There was no question of delegation of power to the President.
That the taxes imposed under the Act are constitutional and that
Congress has power to provide for an expenditure of public
money for the relief of unemployment, and for old age benefits,
is laid down in Justice Cardozo's opinions. An excerpt from what
he says in Helvering v. Davis will serve better than a paraphrase:
"... . Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may
be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the nation.
What is critical or urgent changes with the times.
"... Unemployment spreads from state to state, the hinterland now settled that in pioneer days gave an avenue of escape.
Spreading from state to state, unemployment is an ill not particular but general, which may be checked, if Congress so determines, by the resources of the nation. If this can have been
doubtful until now, our ruling today in the case of the Steward
Machine Co., supra, has set the doubt at rest. But the ill is all
one, or at least not greatly different, whether men are thrown
out of work because there is no longer work to do or because
the disabilities of age make them incapable of doing it. Rescue
becomes necessary irrespective of the cause. The hope behind
this statute is to save men and women from the rigors of the
poorhouse as well as from the haunting fear that such a lot
awaits them when journey's end is near.""
In the National Labor Relations Board cases 5 Justice Cardozo
concurred with the majority in upholding the constitutional
power of Congress to regulate in interstate commerce the relations
of employers and employees with respect to collective bargaining
by the employees.
The case of the Associated Press v. National Labor Relations
12. 301 U.S. 548, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279 (1937).
13. 301 U.S. 619, 57 S.Ct. 904, 81 L.Ed. 1307 (1937).
14. Id. at 641.
15. The Labor Board cases, which were disposed of at the same time in
five separate opinions, are the following: National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893; National
Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 S.Ct. 642, 81
L.Ed. 893; National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Co., 301 U.S. 58, 57 S.Ct. 645, 81 L.Ed. 693; Associated Press v. National Labor
Relations Board), 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953; Washington, Virginia
& Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 57
S.Ct. 648, 81 L.Ed. 965 (1937).
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Board,6 involved not only the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, but also the question of freedom of the press.
Here it was contended that a news editor was discharged because
of his activities in connection with The American Newspaper
Guild, a labor organization. The majority of the Court took the
view that freedom of the press was not denied, and Cardozo
joined in this opinion.
It is interesting to note, however, that when he conceived the
freedom of the press to be endangered, Cardozo was quick to
respond. Thus in an earlier case, Grosjean v. American Press
Co.,17 the State of Louisiana had levied a license tax on newspapers for the privilege of charging for advertising therein, applicable only to newspapers enjoying circulation of more than
20,000 copies per week. It was held that this enactment was
invalid as constituting restraint on the freedom of the press
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Sutherland was the organ of the Court, and
Justice Cardozo was a member. Widely divergent as have been
the views of these two men on other issues where liberty and
government come in conflict, they were agreed in upholding what
Cardozo calls liberty of mind and spirit.
In the well-known case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish8
the Supreme Court upheld a statute establishing minimum wages
for women and thus squarely overruled the earlier case of Adkins
v. Children's Hospital. 9 Justice Cardozo joined in the majority
ruling in the Parrishcase, and this stand was quite in accordance
with his fundamental principles. In The Paradoxes of Legal
Science he had said, "On a plane less exalted than these decisions
that deal with the liberty of the spirit are those that limit the
power of government in the field of economic liberty. The legislature may not require the payment to women workers of a minimum wage, though the wage does not exceed what is essential for
the needs of decent living."20 He cites the Adkins case, and also
indicates other limitations on the power of government in the
economic sphere.
He disclaims any purpose to debate the question whether
these cases or some of them might have been decided differently,
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
plied.)

301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81
297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80
300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81
261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394, 67
Cardozo, The Paradoxes of

L.Ed. 953 (1937).
L.Ed. 660 (1936).
L.Ed. 703 (1937).
L.Ed. 785 (1923).
Legal Science (1928) 99-100.

(Italics sup-
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and he says that his purpose was "merely to inquire whether
liberty may not have a meaning as a concept of social science
which will have illumination for problems of this order as they
come before the court hereafter."'1 He discusses the question
whether the application of the pronouncements of social science
might not in some or even in many instances yield results at
variance with those accepted by the court. Is it to be wondered
at that in 1937 the Cardozo who gave expression to these sentiments should have been found with the majority who voted to
overrule the decision in the Adkins case?
In the famous A.A.A. case,' 2 Justice Stone, dissenting, advocates "the frank recognition that language, even of a constitution,
may mean what it says: that the power to tax and spend includes
the power to relieve a nation-wide economic maladjustment by
conditional gifts of money. '28 Justice Cardozo joined in this dissent. In the Gold Clause cases, 24 Cardozo joined with the majority
in holding that the plenary power of Congress over the monetary
system of the country could not be hampered by agreements between private parties. 25 At the same time he agreed with Chief
Justice Hughes that this rule was not applicable to government
obligations although he felt, as did the majority of the Court, that
26
the holder of the government bond had failed to show damage.
A few cases will now be considered that have probably escaped
the notice of the general public. Shapiro v. Wilgus2 7 was decided
with Cardozo as the organ of a unanimous court. An embarrassed
debtor found that two of his creditors were unwilling to give him
time. Under the law of his home state of Pennsylvania, he could
not have a receiver appointed for himself, as an individual. He
therefore brought about the formation of a Delaware corporation,
to which he transferred all his property, receiving in return substantially all the shares of stock, and a covenant by the grantee
to assume the payment of the debts. Then, in conjunction with a
creditor, he brought suit in the federal court in Pennsylvania
21. Id. at 100.

22. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 312, 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936).
23. Id. at 88.
24. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., United States v. Bankers' Trust
Co., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S.Ct. 407, 79 L.Ed. 885 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294
U.S. 317, 55 S.Ct. 428, 79 L.Ed. 907 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330,
55 S.Ct. 432, 79 L.Ed. 912 (1935).
25. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., United States v. Bankers' Trust
Co., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S.Ct. 407, 79 L.Ed. 885 (1935).
26. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 55 S.Ct. 432, 79 L.Ed. 912 (1935).
27. 287 U.S. 348, 53 S.Ct. 142, 77 L.E1 355 (1932),
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against the newborn Delaware corporation, invoking diversity of
citizenship as the ground of jurisdiction. To the end that, as the
debtor averred, the business might be protected from the suits of
creditors and made to pay a profit to stockholders, a receivership
was prayed for. The corporation answered, admitting all the averments of the bill and joining in the prayer. A decree, entered the
same day, appointed receivers, and enjoined attachments and executions not permitted by the court.
This scheme to thwart the creditor was described as "a purpose which has been condemned in Anglo-American law since the
Statute of Elizabeth (13 Eliz., ch. 5).",2" Justice Cardozo's opinion

shows that the venerable statute was stronger than the infant corporation.
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.29 was a case decided by a 5 to 3

vote, Justice Roberts taking no part. Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo
dissented. Briefly stated, the case went off on a jurisdictional
question, the Supreme Court ordering the dismissal of the bill
because of lack of jurisdiction in a federal court, but without
prejudice to the petitioner's right to proceed in the state court of
New Jersey. Justice Stone leads in the dissent. His review of an
episode in the management of the American Tobacco Company is
luminous and striking. Justice Cardozo's separate dissent contains
the following:
"The doctrine of forum non conveniens is an instrument of
justice. Courts must be slow to apply it at the instance of
directors charged as personal wrongdoers, when justice will be
delayed, even though not thwarted altogether, if jurisdiction
is refused. At least that must be so when the wrong is clearly
proved. The overmastering necessity of rebuking fraud or
breach of trust will outweigh competing policies and shift the
balance of convenience."' 80
McCandless, Receiver, v. Furlaud81 was decided with Cardozo
as the organ of the Court, Roberts, McReynolds, Sutherland and
Butler dissenting. The subject of the case is the fraud of promoters of a corporation. The details of the transactions involved
and discussed will not be here recited; suffice it to say that the
liability of the promoters was affirmed, and Justice Cardozo's
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
288
Id.
296

at 354.
U.S. 123, 53 S.Ct. 295, 77 L.Ed. 652 (1933).
at 151.
U.S. 140, 56 S.Ct. 41, 80 L.Ed. 121 (1935).
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opinion is of the same nature that we might expect, after reading
the dissent in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra.
Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission 2 was a case
in which Justice Sutherland was the organ of the court, and
Justices Cardozo, Brandeis and Stone dissented. The right of a
registrant to withdraw his registration statement without the
consent of the Commission was upheld. A subpoena had been
issued to the registrant, and he withdrew his registration statement without responding to the subpoena. The requirements of
the subpoena were likened by Justice Sutherland to the proceedings of the Star Chamber. To this Cardozo answered:
"A Commission which is without coercive powers, which
cannot arrest or amerce or imprison though a crime has been
uncovered, or even punish for contempt, but can only inquire
and report, the propriety of every question in the course of
the inquiry being subject to the supervision of the ordinary
courts of justice, is likened with denunciatory fervor to the
Star Chamber of the Stuarts. Historians may find hyperbole in
the sanguinary simile.
"The Rule now assailed was wisely conceived and lawfully
adopted to foil the plans of knaves intent upon obscuring or
suppressing the knowledge of their knavery."3
What has been written deals with Justice Cardozo by the
method of formulating his philosophy of law largely in his own
words. The application of that philosophy has been drawn from
his opinions, whether of concurrence or of dissent, during his
tenure as an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
He takes his own measure, in The Paradoxesof Legal Science,
when he compares his labors with those of the designer of a
bridge. It is not for the engineer to have misgivings. His business
is to know. His work is not a mere experiment. He has wrought
a highway to carry men and women from shore to shore, to carry
them secure and unafraid, though the floods rage and boil below.
And then he continues:
"So I cry out at times in rebellion, 'why cannot I do as
much, or at least something measurably as much, to bridge
with my rules of law the torrents of life?' I have given my
years to the task, and behind me are untold generations, the
32. 298 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 654, 80 L.Ed. 1015 (1936).
33. Id. at 33.
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judges and lawgivers of old, who strove with a passion as
burning. Code and commentary, manor-roll and year-book,
treatise and law-report, reveal the processes of trial and error
by which they struggled to attain the truth, enshrine their
blunders and their triumphs for warning and example. All
these memorials are mine; yet unwritten is my table of logarithms, the index of the power to which a precedent must be
raised to produce the formula of justice. My bridges are experiments. I cannot span the tiniest stream in a region unexplored by judges or lawgivers before me, and
go to rest in the
3
secure belief that the span is wisely laid."'
But to the perturbed spirit that uttered this cry there might
have come quieting voices from school and court and marketplace, bearing the message: "You have left no bridge as a monument, but what you have left gives you the right to say with the
Roman poet, 'Non omnis moriar' The currents of life should be
more tranquil because of your living and your teaching. You
have striven as a highway patrolman along the path of the law
to set, at every curve that may lead to sophistry and error and
injustice, the danger signal, Caveat viator."
34. Cardozo, op. cit. supra note 20, at 1-2.

